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Shadowy Banking: Theft By Safety Net
Edward J. Kanet
Shadowy Banking is financial activity that is engineered to extract implicit
subsidies from government safety nets. It substitutes innovative corporate
entities and products for activities that could be performed more
straightforwardly within a traditional banking firm. The shadows obscure
organizational forms and transaction strategies that circumvent regulatory
restraints and extract subsidies by regulation-induced innovation. Because
government support kicks in when private equity is exhausted, safety nets are
implicit contracts that offer loss-absorbing equity capital from taxpayers.
Unlike lenders and insurers who assess and absorb risk, taxpayers accept
Knightian (i.e., unquantifiable) uncertainty. As coerced equity investors whose
liability is unlimited, taxpayers would be better served if information systems
and corporate law were revised to give them at least the same safeguards and
rights of disclosure that minority shareholders enjoy.
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"Through this world I've wandered
I've seen many funny men;
Some will rob you with a six-gun,
And some with a fountain pen."'
Economists typically define shadow banking as "financial activities
occurring outside the regulated banking sector."2 This paper introduces a
broader term, "shadowy banking," to focus on the ways in which even
regulated banking organizations operate outside the boundaries of existing rules
and control procedures.
The paper uses the framework provided by the Regulatory Dialectic3 to
argue that shadowy banking is the inevitable yin to regulation's and taxation's
intended yang. This is because lobbying pressure, privacy protections, and
differences in private and governmental compensation schemes make it easier
and more rewarding for managers of financial institutions to circumvent the
rules than for regulators and tax authorities to come to grips with innovative
forms of circumvention.
How we characterize an explicit or implicit financial contract has
important legal and ethical consequences for its counterparties. A corporation is
a contracting mechanism for sharing risks and returns. Safety-net guarantees
create an unsustainable disequilibrium between taxpayer and corporate property
rights in lightly capitalized firms that are economically, politically or
administratively difficult to fail and unwind (DFU). To rebalance these rights
requires introducing civil and criminal sanctions that would incentivize
managers of DFU firms to give taxpayer-guarantors a fairer deal.
I. WOODY GUTHRIE, Pretty Boy Floyd, on BUFFALO SKINNERS (Asch Recordings Vol. 4
1999) (1939).
2. Nicola Gennaioli at al., A Model ofShadow Banking, 68 J. OF FIN., Aug. 2013 at 1331
3. See Edward J. Kane, Accelerating Inflation, Technological Innovation, and the Decreasing
Effectiveness of Banking Regulation, 36 J. OF FIN. 355, 355 (May 1981) (The concept of "regulatory
dialectic... treats [the] political processes of regulation and economic processes of regulatee avoidance
as opposing forces that ... adapt continually to each other. This alternating adaptation evolves as a series
of lagged responses, with regulators and regulatees seeking to maximize their own objectives,
conditional on how they perceive the opposing party to behave. Market institutions and politically
imposed restraints reshape themselves in a Hegelian manner, simultaneously resolving and renewing an
endless series of conflicts between economic and political power ... Our dialectical approach
emphasizes the tensions, paradoxes, and ambiguities inherent in efforts for regulators either to impose
restraints on persons and institutions that function in what is otherwise a free society or to let markets
impose extraordinary hardships on groups that are politically strong."). See generally Edward J. Kane,





Finding a way to reduce managerial incentives to exploit government
guarantees is the problem. To do this, the supervisory process needs to be re-
engineered to surface and price material information and actions by private
counterparties.
The Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III presume that it is sufficient to place
new balance-sheet and reporting constraints on financial firms, without altering
DFU firms' legal right to pursue ways of shifting risk to taxpayers through
country safety nets. But over time opportunities for industry disinformation,
regulatory lags, and supervisory incentive conflict are bound to reduce the
effectiveness of capital constraints and scenario-driven stress tests. The paper
warns that safety-net subsidies generated by swaps that substitute for traditional
financial contracts are especially difficult to monitor in timely and effective
fashion. A round of failures in swaps transactions could expand safety nets by
threatening the ability of the pension and insurance industries to keep the
promises on which their customers rely.
To protect their citizenry from these dangers, governments need to
develop ways to identify shadowy arrangements promptly and to limit access to
country safety nets more effectively. To generate the information flows and
incentives to do this, my analysis indicates that society must impose and
enforce explicit fiduciary duties of loyalty, competence, and care to taxpayers
on financiers, politicians, regulators, and credit-rating firms. I believe that the
best way to do this is to acknowledge and service the synthetic equity stake that
safety nets create for taxpayers in protected firms. The paper explains that this
loss-absorbing equity stake may be understood as an implicit compound option:
a contract that obligates taxpayers to accept a call that reduces returns on their
position in firms when the firms' insolvency is cured and a put that uses
taxpayers' resources to keep distressed and even zombie firms in business.4 The
exercise of both options is adversely constrained today by lobbying pressure
that makes the managerial norm of maximizing shareholder value inappropriate
for difficult-to-fail shadowy institutions.
The paper has eight sections. Sections 1 and 2 explain the term shadowy
banking and root its existence in the dialectics of safety-net arbitrage. Section 3
explains swap contracts. The next section reviews the role of safety-net
arbitrage in the crisis of 2008. Sections 5 and 6 classify shadowy activities and
explain how they relate to financial engineering, swaps, and the pace of
technological change. Section 7 discusses the implicit put and call positions
that create taxpayers' synthetic equity stake in whatever firms a country's
safety net protects and explains that post-crisis reforms perpetuate the incentive
4. A zombie institution is a firm that has an economic net worth of less than zero, but
continues to operate because its ability to repay and service its debts is shored up by implicit or explicit
government credit support. See Edward J. Kane, Incentive Roots of the Securitization Crisis and Its
Early Mismanagement, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 405,406 (2009).
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conflict that tempts financiers to steal taxpayer resources via the safety net.
Section 8 lays out some policy implications of the paper.
I. What is Shadowy Banking?
Paul McCulley and Gary Gorton have used the idea of banking in dark
places as a clever way to clarify and extend the meaning of the even more
puzzling term "nonbank bank."5 A shadow bank is an institution or bank-
sponsored special-purpose vehicle that has persuaded its customers that its
liabilities can be redeemed defacto at par without delay (or can be traded as if
they will be executed at par without fail at maturity) even though they are not
formally protected by government guarantees. My title adds a "y" and an "ing"
to their term to stretch the shadows to include not just firms like money-market
funds and government-sponsored enterprises, but instruments such as swaps,
repurchase agreements, futures contracts and AAA securitizations that may
trade for substantial periods of time as if they carried zero performance risk.
Of course, any instrument can trade this way if it is believed that well-
funded national or supranational authorities will be afraid not to extend the
safety net to absorb all or most of the losses its holders might suffer. The
perception of a governmental "rescue propensity" is a key element of shadowy
banking. It permits aggressive managements to back risky positions (e.g., in
money-market funds) with the ex ante value of their firm's contingent safety-
net support (i.e., equity capital extracted from hapless national or foreign
taxpayers) rather than stockholder equity.
"Shadowy" is meant to encompass any effort to play upon this propensity
to extract implicit (i.e., confidently conjectured) guarantees from a nation's
financial safety net without informing taxpayers about their exposure to loss
and without adequately compensating them for the value of the contingent
equity support that authorities' rescue propensity imbeds in the shadowy
entity's liability structure. Although most macroeconomists stubbornly portray
the taxpayer side of such claims as an externality, it is more accurately a central
part of the industry's implicit contract for regulatory services: a market-
completing "taxpayer put" which the industry understands as a government-
5. Paul A. McCulley, PIMCO Global Central Bank Focus: Teton Reflections, PIMCO (Sept.
5, 2007), http://www.pimco.com/EN/Insights/Pages/GCBF%20August-%20September/ 202007.aspx.;
see also GARY GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 157 (2010) (discussing
new banking systems in chapter 5, "Bank Regulation When 'Banks' and 'Banking' Are Not the Same").
Both McCulley and Gorton, while not using the term explicitly, expand on the idea of "nonbank banks,"
which Investopedia.com defines as "Financial institutions that are not considered full-scale banks
because they do not offer both lending and depositing services. Nonbank banks can engage in credit card
operations or other lending services, provided they do not also accept deposits." Nonbank Banks,
INVESTOPEDIA.COM , http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nonbank-banks.asp (last visited Jan. 26,
2014) My definition is that a nonbank bank is an organization that is not chartered as a depository
institution, but which does lending, fund-raising, or other business that would traditionally have been




enforced obligation for taxpayers to rescue large and politically powerful firms
when they are in difficult straits.
Shadowy banking may also be called Safety-Net Arbitrage. It covers any
financial organization, product, or transaction strategy that - now or in the
future - can opaquely (i.e., nontransparently) extract subsidized guarantees
from national and cross-country safety nets by means of "regulation-induced
innovation." This way of thinking about the safety net clarifies that loss-
absorbing equity supplied by taxpayers serves as the net's buttresses. It also
implies that the shadowy sector is a moving target. It consists of whatever
entities can issue a worrisomely large volume of financial instruments that,
given the boundaries of current laws or control procedures, are either actually
or potentially outside the statutory grip of the several agencies currently
charged with monitoring and managing the financial safety net.
Lobbyists for protected firms work hard to convince politicians and
regulators that maintaining a regulatory environment that offers blanket support
to important financial enterprises is in officials' best interests, if not necessarily
those of society as a whole.6 In the words of the late James Q. Wilson, safety-
net managers operate "not in an arena of competing interests to which all
affected parties have reasonable access, but in a shadowy world of powerful
lobbyists, high-priced attorneys, and manipulative 'experts." 7
II. Shadowy Banking is Shaped by a Regulatory Dialectic
"Dialectics" is the art of arriving at the truth by becoming aware of
contradictions and missing elements in opposing beliefs and overcoming or
lessening the contradictions by confronting them with logical analysis or
empirical evidence. A Hegelian process has three stages: Thesis, Antithesis,
and Synthesis. In analyzing financial and regulatory competition, the predictive
power of this evolutionary model comes from positing that each synthesis
establishes an environment that serves as a thesis to be challenged afresh by
new ideas and experience. When used to explain economic competition
between differently regulated firms, the Hegelian Dialectical Model seeks to
explain institutional change as a process of Incentive Conflict Generation,
Conflict Resolution, and Conflict Renewal.
Regulation generates incentive conflict because it seeks to impose outside
rules on another party's behavior. To the extent that they undesirably limit
one's freedom of action, outside rules impose an unwelcome burden on each
intended "regulatee." This is why changes in regulation beget avoidance
behavior (i.e., inventive ways of getting around the new rules) and, by
6. See, e.g., Silla Brush and Robert Schmidt, How the Bank Lobby Loosened U.S. Reins on
Derivatives, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sept. 4, 2013 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-
04/how-the-bank-lobby-loosened-u-s-reins-on-derivatives.html .
7. JAMES Q. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (1980) (emphasis added).
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refraining the conflict, avoidance behavior begets regulatory change (re-
regulation). As in any dialectical process, the interaction of the conflicting
forces supports a process of endless action and reaction. Viewed as an
economic game, the alternating sequences of moves impose, escape, and adjust
regulatory burdens. As it unfolds, the process reshapes financial institutions,
contracting protocols, and markets around the world.
A. An Instructive Analogy
Most of us have our first encounter with regulation within our immediate
family where we emerge as an inexperienced child regulatee. Our parents set
rules and proffer rewards and punishments in hopes of conditioning us to
behave according to these rules. Short-term rewards usually take the form of
tangible and intangible expressions of approval, while short-term punishments
run a gamut of physical and psychological sanctions.
Troublesome kids may be seen in the best of families. Parents' long-run
goal is to develop a well-behaved child who takes pride in living up to the set
of parental rules, which is to say a child who has developed a keen sense of
shame. When conformance with parental rules becomes a child's own preferred
course of behavior (and ideally a source of self-esteem), enforcement problems
melt away. But most parents show a rescue propensity of their own, so that
conditioning efforts at least partially backfire. Children who recognize this
propensity and refuse to be bound by parental rules may pursue either of two
paths: defiant disobedience or creative avoidance. For a given rule, the mixture
of compliance, avoidance, and evasion that is chosen depends on the strength of
the child's aversion to the mandated behavior (compliance costs) and on the
relative opportunity costs of evasion and avoidance.
Autonomous children that psychologists would label as well-adjusted
generate most of their long-run regulatory environment on their own. They
fashion their particular ideas of right and wrong and pursue strategies of
prudent circumvention that are designed to reconcile their wants and needs with
the outer limits of parental rules. Like banks, securities, and insurance firms,
they learn to comply with the letter of unwelcome rules while shamelessly
abusing their spirit. By learning to find and exploit loopholes, a child relieves
himself or herself simultaneously of guilt and unpleasant restraints. Moreover,
the sense of having overcome adversity in an inventive way tends to instill and
sustain a positive view of one's own cleverness.
Avoidance differs from outright evasion by respecting the words of a
command, even as the intent of the command is at least partially frustrated. The
avoider has a lawyerlike or playful perspective on rules that differs from the
criminal mindset of the nonupright, undisciplinable child. An evader is unruly.
An avoider is a resourceful escape artist who welcomes the challenge of




B. Loopholes as Entitlements
It is costly for regulators to come to grips with avoidance behavior.
Parents and government officials are reluctant to search for and eliminate
loopholes in advance or to close loopholes until they have taken time to
appreciate their effects. However, unlike government regulators in
representative democracies, parents are free to discourage circumvention by
punishing avoidance ex post as if it were the same as evasion. Children can
lobby, but they cannot vote into office a more desirable set of parents.
Moreover, because children's regulatory rights are not closely protected by an
administrative system of appellate law, the opportunity cost of avoidance
behavior is high for children whose parents refuse to acknowledge and honor
the legitimacy of searching out loopholes in their rules.
Some readers may find it instructive to view the Regulatory Dialectic as
an evolving game that has no stationary equilibrium.8 It is played repeatedly by
differently informed, differently incentivized, and differently skilled players:
financiers, regulators, lobbyists, politicians, customers, credit-rating firms, and
taxpayers. The timing and space of potential moves cannot be fully known in
advance, but individual moves parallel the stages featured in the Hegelian
model: (1) Adjustments in Regulation; (2) Burden-Softening Lobbying,
Disinformation, and Avoidance (which occur rapidly and creatively); and (3)
Re-regulation (which usually takes considerable time to develop). Some of the
players (taxpayers and some regulators) are perennial "suckers," who only
occasionally and temporarily realize that the game is rigged against them.
Processes of financial regulation and financial-institution avoidance
produce shadows and light at the same time. Loopholes are seen as entitlements
that were woven into the rules by skilled and knowledgeable lobbyists who
frame problems and potential solutions in a self-interested way. The Dodd-
Frank Act of 2010 tasked regulators with writing hundreds of rules for the
avowed purpose of lessening subsidies to aggressive risk-taking. To appreciate
the flaws in this process, one must understand that Congress and industry
lobbyists are aware that it is not unusual for regulatory personnel to prefer rules
that lessen the enforcement and political problems that stringent restraints place
on them.
III. Regulation of Swaps
Swaps and other contracts whose net worth "derive" from referenced
instruments are financial derivatives. I believe that precedents established by
the AIG and other 2008 rescues suggest that the next round of safety-net
arbitrage is likely to be rooted in the difficulty of regulating swaps that, like
credit default swaps (CDS), substitute for traditional insurance and pension
8. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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protections. Swaps are another in a long line of financially engineered
substitutes for direct funding from savers to investors. Constructively, a swap
agreement is a multi-period forward contract between two counterparties. In a
swap, the parties agree to exchange cash flows from one hypothetical or
"notional" instrument at specified settlement dates for the cash flows from a
second designated instrument. Either or both of the instruments may-but need
not-have a precise cash-market counterpart. The two sides of each swap may
be regarded as establishing a synthetic incremental balance sheet that renders
each counterparty long a series of claims (known as the "receive half") and
short a series of obligations (the "pay half"). As a balance sheet, the value
difference between the two halves is the contract's net worth.
But the statutory definition of the term "swap" embraces a much wider
range of deals than this constructive description accommodates. In particular, it
authorizes insurance and reinsurance contracts to be written as swaps. The
statutory concept of a swap includes, in part, any agreement, contract or
transaction "that provides for any purchase, sale, payment or delivery (other
than a dividend on an equity security) that is dependent on the occurrence,
nonoccurrence, or the extent of the occurrence of an event or contingency
associated with a potential financial, economic, or commercial consequence." 9
With respect to taxpayers' equity position in the safety net, swaps raise
two issues. First, the staffs of the federal agencies charged with regulating swap
markets-the SEC and CFTC-have developed expertise and tools appropriate
for supervising individual and enterprise market conduct rather than systemic
risk. Second, industry influence on both agencies has been institutionalized.
Neither agency can be consistently counted upon to elevate taxpayers' interests
over those of the industries they simultaneously regulate and represent. In the
past, the revolving door between the SEC and the securities industry seems to
have been pushed much harder than any of the levers agency personnel have
used to fight against corporate fraud and misrepresentation. The revolving door
has also helped the derivatives industry to lobby successfully for preferential
treatment of swaps and repos in bankruptcy with outright disdain for the way
their statutory priority might disadvantage the taxpayer's equity position in the
safety net.
It has been left to state insurance regulators, exchanges, dealers, and
brokers to assess contract risk and to use bonding tools (e.g., screening traders'
net worth; establishing margin requirements; and enforcing minimum standards
for collateral quality) to assure counterparty performance. The industry's
principal risk-assessment tool is value-at-risk analysis, which specifically
excludes the scale of the damage likely to be done by the low-probability
events most apt to trigger systemic problems. Moreover, the ease with which
MF Global delayed its meltdown in October 2011 by posting almost $900




million of customer funds to cover losses in a UK broker-dealer account
suggests that in some jurisdictions the rules governing the re-hypothecation of
customer collateral and how margins may be netted across different positions
may make posted margins less than fully collectable when a swap participant
defaults.10
Historically, most swaps have been arranged with a third-party dealer or
market maker. This trader collects a fee for lessening the due-diligence and
search costs that its customers might otherwise face. The fee may be expressed
as a spread between the terms offered for taking up one side or the other of a
particular swap. As compared with a brokered market, the customer receives
immediate execution and the dealer becomes the counterparty for both sides of
the deal.
Efficient deal-making generates two types of transactions costs: pre-
contract shopping, negotiating, and due-diligence expense and post-contract
enforcement and unwinding expense. Whether an individual is a saver or an
investor, the opportunity costs encountered in undertaking a swap parallel those
met in comparing the benefits and costs of contracting directly with a
household or nonfinancial firm against using, for example, a. bank to
intermediate the deal. Prudent savers and investors have to assess the
differences in the benefits of contracting indirectly and weigh these benefits
against the differences in transaction costs. Most households lack the expertise
needed to make direct lending or borrowing the better alternative.
When the two halves are equally valuable, the swap is said to be "at" or
"on" the market. Usually, however, the incremental balance sheet of one
counterparty will show positive net worth. That party faces a risk that the party
with negative net worth will renege on some or all of its obligation. If it were
not for this nonperformance risk, one could construct combinations of swap
contracts that would reproduce synthetically the exact cash flows generated by
any cash-market portfolio or government-chartered financial intermediary. This
means that differences in the dangers of nonperformance (known in the trade as
"counterparty risk") lie at the heart of the regulatory problems that swaps and
other derivatives pose for society.
A. Swaps Regulation Under the Dodd-Frank Act
Because banking, securities and insurance products have existed for
hundreds of years, the dimensions of their regulatory environments have been
nailed down in important ways. But because swap contracts are less than a half-
century old, their regulatory environment is much more fluid. Cross-country
issues and the volume of interagency rule-making to be completed under the
10. Aaron Lucchetti & Mike Spector, The Unraveling of MF Global, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31,
2011, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 10001424052970203686204577117114075444418 .
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Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 makes the toolkits and architecture of future swaps
regulation particularly swampy today.
Data on the size of potential imbalances in dealer positions are not readily
available. But the major dealers are giant banking institutions that benefit from
the perception that they would not be allowed to fail. In hopes of pushing
swaps trading out of the shadows and beyond the protections of the safety net,
the Dodd-Frank Act asks the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to set rules whose
intent is threefold.
First, the Act calls for real-time reporting of swaps transactions to be
installed as soon as this becomes technologically practicable." Unlike many
Dodd-Frank Act assignments, CFTC real-time reporting rules have been
finalized and SEC real-time reporting rules have been proposed.12 US swaps
dealers and clearing organizations are required to report their trades to a swaps
data repository (SDR).13 As the word "repository" suggests, SDRs merely store
data. So far, three SDRs are operating in the US: the Depository Trust &
Clearing Corporation (which is owned by a consortium of financial services
firms); the CME Group; and the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE).14
The second and third goals are to force high-volume swap instruments to
be standardized as far as possible and to move trading in such instruments onto
futures exchanges and swaps execution facilities where it is hoped that
positions might be monitored and supervised more effectively.' On an
exchange, the search function is undertaken jointly by brokers who transmit
customer bids and offers to the exchange and by the exchange which clears
(i.e., novates) the trades and guarantees that execution will occur on the trading
date. '
Performance guarantees on an exchange are backed up formally by broker
and exchange due-diligence, collateral assessment, and margining procedures.
At both the exchange and broker levels, margin and net-worth requirements are
set relative to the perceived volume and character of a counterparty's trading.
Brokers protect themselves by screening customers and margining the value of
short sales and pending trades. Exchanges support contract performance further
11. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act [hereinafter Dodd-Frank
Act] Pub.L. 111-203, H.R. 4173, § 727.
12. Real Time Reporting of Swap Transaction Data, 17 C.F.R. pt. 43 (2012),
http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/FederalRegister/FinalRules/2011-33173 ; Security-Based Swap
Data Repository, Registration, Duties, and Core Principles, 78 Fed. Reg. 30,800 (May 23, 2013) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240 and pt. 249) (proposed Dec. 10, 2010, comment period reopened May 23,
2013), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2010/34-63347.pdf.
13. Dodd-Frank Act, § 723(h)(5)(B).
14. Depository Registration in the US., CFTC WEBSITE,
http://sirt.cftc.gov/sirt/sitt.aspx?Topic=DataRepositories (Only DTCC, CME and ICE have provisional
registration. All other organizations are either pending registration or have withdrawn.) Dec. 8, 2013.





by screening brokers for reputation, competence, and net worth and by holding
margin accounts posted by brokers. If a customer or broker fails to deliver its
half of the trade on the execution date, the exchange's clearing corporation or
partnership is obliged to complete the trade.17
But dictating exchange trading for standardized swaps is different from
eliminating the possibility of safety-net arbitrage in swaps markets. First,
forcing unwilling dealers to shift the bulk of their market-making activity onto
an exchange is much easier said than done. Because standardized swaps carry
more basis risk than customized ones, many customers will continue to prefer
customized terms, all the more so since giant dealer banks will be smart enough
to protect their dominant positions by stressing the value of customization and
adopting pricing policies that shift a portion of their safety-net subsidy forward.
Second, the more important swaps trading on a particular exchange might
become, the better its clearing members will see that adopting a holding-
company form (as many have already done) will limit their individual and joint
liability in crises and would help them if the exchange itself should ever
become insolvent to whip up the financial, political and administrative fear
necessary to trigger officials' bailout propensity.
B. Early Form ofRegulation-Induced Innovation.
The Dodd-Frank Act expressly exempted futures contracts from the swap
definition.' 8 This opens the door for any futures exchange that wants to trade an
innovative swap-like product to self-certify the proposed instrument as a
futures contract and to request that the new contract be placed under the
CFTC's jurisdiction. In fact, emerging regulatory arbitrage is taking the form of
exchange-traded swaps futures contracts that substitute for traditional swap
contracts. The new contracts may either settle in cash or settle into swaps
contracts with the futures exchange at the expiration date. The convenience and
favorable margin treatment of these contracts threatens to shrink the OTC deal
flow available to swaps dealers and other clearing organizations. Information
on these trades is likely to be routed to the exchange's affiliated data repository
from which genuinely informative trade data might be packaged with analysis
and sold at a profit to private parties.
C. Cross-Country Issues
The costs and benefits of expanding a financial firm's geographic
footprint have regulatory dimensions. International expansion creates
opportunities for competition and regulatory arbitrage between domestic and
foreign regulators. Regulators must think deeply about competition between
17. Dodd-Frank Act, §721
18. Id.
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established central clearing parties (CCPs) and other swaps platforms located in
Europe, Canada, and Asia. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange has already
made it possible for its clients to book a few of its foreign-exchange and
interest-rate contracts with a London affiliate and London-based exchanges
could return the favor by registering a swaps CCP as a Swaps Execution
Facility with the CFTC and let it book a selection of high-volume contracts in
the US."
Evolving US derivatives rules are further along and arguably more
onerous than those of other countries and impose reporting obligations on
trades that cannot easily be reconciled with other countries' privacy laws.
British, EU, and other foreign regulators have expressed concern that applying
CFTC and SEC registration, capital, and collateral requirements to foreign
branches, affiliates, or subsidiaries of US institutions may affect other
regulators' freedom to tailor rules for foreign and domestic firms operating in
their own jurisdictions.
Without acknowledging the extent to which their actions can shift tail risk
onto the US safety net, foreign regulators are working to persuade the SEC and
CFTC -in a spirit of cooperation-to write into their final rules a generous
framework of "substituted compliance." 20 Substituted compliance means that
foreign affiliates would be regulated by the country in which they are domiciled
as long as the country enforces rules sufficiently comparable (i.e. similar) to
those of the U.S. In its Proposed Guidance the CFTC used the phrase "rules
comparable and comprehensive" to relevant Dodd-Frank requirements, 21 but
22enforcement was delayed.
In July 2013, the CFTC issued guidance interpreting the Dodd-Frank Act
as classifying for regulatory purposes the overseas arms of US banking
organizations as "US persons."2 Although the CFTC authorized some
exceptions, interpreting the Dodd-Frank Act in this way threatened to expand
the territorial reach of CFTC scrutiny so that swaps that US persons execute
abroad would not be regulated any differently from those they execute in the
US.
19. The CME's London contracts are described on their website OTC Financial Derivative
Products, CME Group http://www.cmegroup.com/europe/clearing-europe/products/otc-financial-
derivatives.html. (last visited Aug. 13, 2014)
20. John Coffee, Regulatory Arbitrage and Substituted Compliance, CORP. CRIME REPORTER,
(Sept. 17, 2013)
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/johncoffeeregulatoryarbitrage09l72013/.
21. Press Release, United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission, CFTC Approves
Proposed Interpretive Guidance on Cross-Border Application of the Swaps Provisions of the Dodd-
Frank Act (June 29, 2012), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6293-12.
22. Exemptive Order Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg.
43,787 (July 22, 2013).
23. Press Release, United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission, The European





The CFTC's interpretation was challenged by foreign regulators and their
challenge found a sympathetic SEC. In an April 18, 2013 letter, officials from
Germany, France, the UK, Japan, and the European Commission recommended
that substituted compliance be made available to all market participants for all
transactions-level and entity-level rules.24 Less than two weeks later, the SEC
formally proposed to permit overseas-based firms in securities-based swaps to
adhere to their foreign jurisdiction's rules in deals with US firms so long as the
foreign rules are "broadly comparable" to US requirements. 25 The SEC's
proposal emphasized that it would be focused on examining "regulatory
outcomes" instead of comparing rules.2 6
The CFTC's lag in observing outcomes opens a broad back-door path for
circumventing the burdens of U.S. rules. The two crucial remaining issues are
who in the US will determine when one set of rules is apt to produce outcomes
or rules comparable to those of the US and how to verify the adequacy of the
enforcement of acceptability on a continuing basis.
At least for the time being, the CFTC has acceded to undocumented
industry claims that multiple record-keeping requirements would create more
compliance costs than safety-net benefits. On August 13, 2013, the CFTC
adopted a rule that granted substituted compliance to the SEC for registered
investment companies. 2 7 Then, on December 13, 2013, it granted substituted
compliance to regulatory authorities in Australia, the E.U., Hong Kong, Japan,
28
and Switzerland. One can only hope that accountability for substituted
compliance decisions can be established before the next crisis.
D. Why Do the Definitions and Tests Entailed in Substituted Compliance Raise
Issues ofShadowy Banking?
Given the worldwide threat of regulatory capture, the result that is both to
be feared and to be expected is that sooner or later some major foreign
regulators will be encouraged by politicians and financial-sector lobbyists to
substitute for US standards inadequate rules or enforcement procedures. This
24. Open Letter from various ministers of finance, to Jack Lew, Sec. of the Treas., April 18,
2013, available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/inter/etc/20130419-1/01 .pdf.
25. Press Release, United States Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Proposes Rule for
Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activity (May 1, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/l365171514072#.UuWFfYo7Ac.
26. Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR and
Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major
Security-Based Swap Participants; Proposed Rule,78 Fed. Reg. 30,968, 30,975 (May 23, 2013) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240, pt. 242, and pt. 249).
27. Press Release, United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission, CFTC Adopts
harmonization Rule for Registered Investment Companies (Aug. 13, 2013),
http://www.cfic.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6663-13.
28. Press Release, United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission, CFTC Approves
Comparability Determinations for Six Jurisdictions for Substituted Compliance Purposes (Dec. 20,
2013), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6802-13.
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will attract trading volume to these jurisdictions and generate systemic risk that,
in crisis circumstances, these foreign governments are likely to shift onto the
US safety net by demanding subsidized emergency market-stabilizing loans
from the Federal Reserve.
IV. Reinterpreting the Role of Swaps in the Panic of 2008
It has become customary to characterize the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers as triggering the panic of September 2008. However, I believe that
public confidence in the competence and fairness of the government's
regulatory leadership and the reliability of private performance guarantees was
destroyed by the combination of a yet-to-be-fully-explained double U-turn in
bailout policy (of which Lehman was only the smallest part) and unwise
presidential fear-mongering in support of a panicky blank-check program,
TARP.29 Within the space of a few weeks, federal officials moved from
contributing over $100 billion to creditors of Fannie and Freddie, to making
undercollateralized creditors of Lehman take their lumps in bankruptcy, then to
committing roughly $180 billion to bailing out the creditors and swap
counterparties of the American International Group (AIG) and demanding that
Congress appropriate $700 billion to buy up distressed assets from other
troubled firms at inflated prices. 3 0 The AIG rescue broke new ground because it
represented the first time that federal support was extended to an insolvent US
insurance firm whose unfulfilled obligations had exceeded the value of state
guaranty schemes and because it dispensed with opportunities to haircut the
firm's creditors.
Two things made AIG different from other insurance insolvencies. First,
at the time of its implosion AIG had $1.06 trillion in assets and operated 246
separate insurance and other financial-services companies.3 1 This made it by far
the largest "insurance firm" in the country. Second, although AIG's traditional
life, casualty, and retirement business was supervised by state officials in
traditional ways, various "insurance-related activities" had morphed out of the
jurisdiction of state regulatory regimes via swap contracts and into the purview
of the relatively clueless Office of Thrift Supervision.
AIG offered its counterparties two forms of security: AIG's "reputation"
and the right to call for collateral if its credit rating fell below AAA. These
transactions were booked in opaque subsidiary corporations that transacted in
convenient foreign jurisdictions (especially London) with a large number of
foreign counterparties. To understand the regulatory arbitrage this entails,
29. Edward J. Kane, Incentive Roots of the Securitization Crisis and Its Early
Mismanagement, 26 YALE J. ON REG., 405 (2009).
30. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REPORT ON THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM
1, (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/TARPI0-2012_0.pdf





consider the advantages of using a swap to guarantee payments due on a bond.
In the US, a bond insurance contract would have had to be written by a state-
regulated entity. This underwriter would explicitly have to estimate and reserve
for the loss exposures generated by its guarantee and to establish the existence
of an insurable interest on the part of the counterparty (i.e., a long position in
the bond); counterparty claims would be settled over time by assuming the
string of future payments specified by the bond contract. Although Dodd-Frank
rulemaking might change this in the future, credit default swaps (CDS)
dispensed with these restrictions. Over-the-counter CDS market makers like
AIG could write contracts with counterparties that had no insurable interest, did
not have to document how they reserved for losses, and at settlement would
usually be required to make a single lump-sum payment.
The highly concentrated risks that AIG took in swap and securities-
lending activities in London were inconsistent with state commissioners'
traditional concern for protecting policyholder interests and the New York
commission would have stopped them if they had had authority for overseeing
foreign subsidiaries. Some state officials took what turned out to be cold
comfort from the fact that AIG subsidiaries and the firm as a whole were
supervised at a consolidated level as a thrift-institution holding company by the
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS).32 Unfortunately, AIG management knew
all too well that this regulator lacked the expertise, the windows into foreign
jurisdictions, and the incentives to monitor and control the leverage and
volatility inherent in AIG's burgeoning derivatives and securities-lending
businesses. A useful way to understand the AIG debacle is to think of one of its
divisions as a "booking bureau" whose task was to place derivatives business in
shadowy subsidiaries and foreign markets, which rendered its potential
regulators severely overmatched.
AIG illustrates the maxim that firms-like people-are born simple, but
die of complications. Corporate complications are both structural and
contractual. Table 1, which is taken from Sjostrum,3 3 shows how AIG
partitioned its activities and that the profitability of AIG's financial-services
subsidiaries declined steeply in 2007 and 2008. These losses triggered cash
flows and collateral calls in credit default swaps and securities lending that AIG
proved unable to sustain.
One alleged benefit of segregating different product lines within a
holding-company structure is that it allows a firm to use contractual firewalls to
stop losses in one unit from spreading in bankruptcy proceedings to other units.
Another is that this arrangement can facilitate a voluntary restructuring of the
32. On American International Group: Examining What went Wrong, Government,
Intervention, and Implication for Future Regulation, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Scott M. Polakoff, Managing Dir.,
Office of Thrift Supervision) (transcript available at http://www.occ.gov/static/news-
issuances/ots/testimony/ots-testimony-tsl71-03-05-2009.pdf).
33. William K. Sjostrom Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV., 943, 947 (2009).
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firm if and when it falls into distress. However, neither of these benefits was
realized in the AIG debacle. Because top management decisions were not being
closely monitored, AIG officials had to be tempted to offer implicit cross-
guarantees from its insurance units to persuade counterparties to lessen the
collateral requirements they might impose or to increase the fees collected on
deals with swap and securities-lending counterparties. In the absence of explicit
inter-affiliate guarantees and in states where such guarantees might prove
unenforceable, the profits of the insurance units would have stayed positive
because counterparties could not have used the threat of bankruptcy to force the
parent to use these units to honor claims written against loss-making affiliates.
At least arguably, the doctrine of corporate separateness would have allowed
the claims of derivatives counterparties to be separated from the insurance units
in a prepackaged bankruptcy and given appropriate haircuts.
Both at the Treasury and the Fed, the initial justification for rescuing AIG
and keeping its many counterparties whole was not protecting the firm's
policyholder and pension-plan reserves, but "unusual and exigent
34
circumstances" in banking, commercial-paper, and derivatives markets. It was
the fear that "a disorderly failure of AIG could add to already significant levels
of financial market fragility and lead to substantially higher borrowing costs,
reduced household wealth, and materially weaker economic performance."35
The irony is that dire events along the lines of those described happened
anyway. Forcing AIG's counterparties to take some lumps in a hastily
negotiated bankruptcy settlement would at least have shown an explicit concern
for taxpayer costs. Because blanket guarantees typically finance negative-value
gambles for resurrection, Kane argues that keeping zombie institutions like
AIG in play without subjecting their asset and funding structures to triage
prolongs and intensifies-rather than mitigates-the adverse effects that
gambles by these firms exert on the real economy.
Figure 1 shows that AIG's stock price fell sharply during the panic, but
remained well above zero through the end of 2008. The continued decline in
this price and in indices of consumer and business confidence in October and
November 2008 (e.g., the Indexes shown in Figures 3 and 4) support my belief
that the $700 Billion TARP rescue and the lack of checks and balances
envisaged in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act combined with poorly
explained differences in the extravagance of government assistance across the
chain of 2008 bailouts to lead much of the citizenry to lose faith in the
competence and economic priorities of the nation's top economic officials.
Unlike Santa Claus, the Fed and Treasury seemed determined to give gifts only
to people and firms that had behaved badly.
34. Id. at 976.




An authoritative account has yet to emerge of which officials knew what
and when they knew it. But as a minimum, state and federal regulators must
have noticed that profitability of AIG's financial-services units had been
declining for several years at a rate that, thanks to implicit and explicit cross-
guarantees, threatened AIG's ability to pay policyholder and pension claims in
its traditional and retirement insurance businesses. The breakdown in
supervision was not just that state and OTS personnel failed to curb AIG's
growing losses and loss exposures, but that the Fed, the SEC, and foreign
counterpart agencies failed either to see or to do anything about the
nonperformance risk that was building up in banking and securities firms that
held the other side of AIG's deals. The depth and breadth of the cross-country
regulatory failure suggest to me that an unspoken reason for completely bailing
out AIG's creditors and counterparties was bureaucratic blame avoidance. In
the US in particular, Figure 3 and numerous other political polls show that the
Bush Administration became increasingly unpopular over the final years of its
span in office. Top officials could not reasonably expect to hold office beyond
January 20, 2009. The rescue's generous treatment of AIG creditors and
counterparties converted what would have been immediate industry criticism
for being asleep at the wheel into applause for the Treasury's fast action and
political bravery and shifted the unpopular task of explicitly funding the rescue
forward onto the Fed and succeeding administrations.
V. Classification of Shadowy Firms and Practices
The safety-net arbitrage seen in the AIG case may be characterized as
theft by safety net. Such theft seeks to identify and exploit gaps in a nation's or
region's framework of financial regulation and supervision, gaps that allow the
arbitrageur to extract safety-net benefits from conjectural guarantees without
compensating taxpayers for their full cost of production. It is a dynamic and
creative form of purposively self-interested behavior. Inevitable differences in
the information and contracting opportunities available to institutions,
regulators, and taxpayers mean that, whatever changes in the fabric of
regulation financial authorities make, they will soon find themselves
outcoached, outgunned, and playing from behind. This is why shadowy
banking can never be completely eliminated. Still, the damage that crises create
might be lessened if voters could be made to understand the extent of
regulatory arbitrage.
Four distinct kinds of regulatory and tax avoidance take place within the
shadowy sector. The first and most obvious is that of regulatory capture, in
which regulated parties rig rules or enforcement in their favor. But shadowy
banking also includes strategies for developing financial products or chartering
firms in which regulators may or may not be complicit. These involve three
additional financial-engineering strategies that:
Do not fall under the rubric of existing laws (i.e., exploit statutory gaps);
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Are deliberately designed to fall outside the span of control defined by
existing regulatory practices (i.e., exploit procedural gaps);
Can be redesigned to exploit either or both types of gaps once the benefits
of escaping burdensome regulations or oversight become great enough to
overcome implementation costs (i.e., will take advantage of gaps that have not
yet been exploited).
Managers of large financial institutions have made intensive use of all
four strategies. At year-end 2011, Table 2 contrasts the number of domestic
bank, domestic nonbank, and foreign subsidiaries at the largest US bank
holding companies (BHCs) with a selection of smaller BHCs. Figure 4 shows
that the extraordinary structural complexity of the largest and most politically
powerful US bank holding companies (three of which were investment banks
and insurance companies that were only conjecturally connected to the formal
safety net prior to 2008) developed only after 1989 when the Savings and Loan
crisis clarified the extent to which the largest firms in the industry might count
on taxpayer support to help them survive emergency circumstances.
Crisscrossing lines of authority within such organizations makes them difficult
to control from the top down. For this reason, it seems very likely (as in the
AIG case) that one attraction of a complicated network of subsidiaries is to
place activities in jurisdictions in which it is hard for government officials to
supervise them.
As I have indicated, large US institutions can derive benefits from
exploiting statutory or procedural gaps in local and global statutory and control
frameworks. Subsidiary corporations can book selected business in less heavily
regulated parts of the US financial sector or perform activities in foreign
countries that are outlawed or more closely regulated in their home country.
Table 3 quantitatively shows that U.S. BHCs' nonbank subsidiaries more or
less split their organizations' high-value structured securitization business with
their more closely monitored banking subsidiaries.
It is also true that any bank can circumvent the FDIC's statutory limits on
account coverage by writing bilateral swap contracts through the Promontory
Interfinancial Network. Although it operates as a swaps broker, Promontory is
not itself federally regulated,36 even though (and perhaps because) its founders
include a former Comptroller of the Currency and a former Governor of the
Federal Reserve System. This firm offers an OTC swap product that allows a
single depositor to push its FDIC coverage from $250,000 per depositor
envisioned in the FDIC Act to as much as $50 million.37 Promontory named
this product the "Certificate of Deposit Account Registry Service" (CDARS).
36. Broker Check, FINRA, (Jan. 26, 2014),
http://brokercheck.finra.org/SearchlSearchResults.aspx?SearchGroup=Firm&IndlText--&FirmText-664
56&PageNumberl.






CDARS acts as a clearinghouse. It re-books balances in excess of FDIC limits
(i.e., statutorily uninsured deposits) from one institution as below-the-limit
increments in deposits that are swapped into other institutions. The injustice of
the arbitrage is that Promontory collects fees for re-booking these deposits,
while the FDIC incurs the costs of providing the over-line coverage. It seems
likely that during crisis years deposits supplied through CDARS helped to
sustain the life of more than a few zombie banks.
The lessons inherent in the CDARS program generalize to the broader
swaps market. Almost anything that carries an explicit or implicit government
guarantee can be swapped in great volume and achieving high volume
establishes the equivalent of a squatter's right. This is because authorities are
reluctant to roll back innovations once they have achieved widespread use.
CDARS shows that swaps designed to arbitrage the safety net can easily go
viral if authorities do not intervene. At this writing, approximately 3,000
financial institutions belonged to the CDARS deposit-swapping network. Like
sponsors of the first retail money-market funds, the sponsors of CDARS
extended the effective reach of the US safety net and dared authorities to do
something about it.
VI. Why Shadowy Banking Generates Disadvantaged Taxpayer Equity
The more policy debates I examine, the better I understand Friedrich
Nietzsche's claim that "[t]here are no facts, only interpretations." 38 Almost all
forms of financial engineering and shadowy banking offer some benefits to
society. This is because at the same time that financiers use emerging
technologies to extract safety-net subsidies, they create new, better, or cheaper
services for their customers. This favorable dimension of innovation is apt to be
overstressed, especially in the narratives that sponsors of shadowy instruments
offer regulators and the public to justify their existence. As an example,
consider the half-true content of the pleas to spare money-market funds
(MMFs) from further restrictions that former Comptroller Hawke published on
the American Banker's Bank Think website. 39 Hawke disputes the contention
that MMFs deserve to be called shadow banks. He denies that they are
exploiting any statutory or procedural gaps because they are in fact supervised
by the SEC. He denies that MMFs face an "appreciable threat of future runs" 4 0
(assuming away the danger of asset-concentration risk) and frames his
38. Friedrich Nietzsche, unpublished notebooks (circa 1880) (quoted at The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Friedrich Nietzsche, Stanford University
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/ (last updated Ap. 29, 2011)).
39. John D. Hawke, Jr. Ask Questions Before Shooting Money Market Funds, AM. BANKER,
Jan 9, 2012, http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/Ask-Questions-Before-Shooting-Money-
Funds-1045823-1.html?CMP=OTC-RSS; Why Paul Volcker is Wrong About Money Market Funds, AM.
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presentation to indicate that the temporary liquidity facilities put in place to
save the industry in September 2008 did not cost taxpayers more than a "penny
on the dollar.'AI
Regulatory arbitrage can generate safety-net benefits for particular firms,
politicians, regulators, and categories of customers. Statutory and procedural
gaps offer legal, but inherently unethical opportunities for different parties to
exploit and corrupt one another. Corruption deepens as the stakes rise and when
incentive conflict tempts other players to join in a coalition to exploit
taxpayers. As Francis Bacon explains, opportunity makes the thief.42
Central bankers' rescue propensity leaves taxpayers holding the short side
of an implicit regulatory contract. This contract allows elite financial firms: (1)
to put ruinous losses onto government safety nets if and when creditors refuse
to roll over their debts and derivatives at "reasonable" (i.e., low) cost and (2) to
exercise a call on the government's position if and when the debt overhang has
been eliminated. That exploiting taxpayers through the safety net is touted as
evidence of managerial proficiency without also being worn as a badge of
shame signals the extent of the moral vacuum that has overtaken the debate
over bailout policies.
Safety-net arbitrage is at heart a form of theft. One way to see this is to
think of difficult-to-fail institutions as using a gun to force Uncle Sam or John
Bull to extract money from the wallets of hapless taxpayers. We can think of
the bullets in the gun as disinformation, fear, campaign contributions, and post-
government jobs.
Genuine reform has to embrace and enforce the common-sense notion that
managers of DFU firms owe fiduciary duties to taxpayers. This is because
authorities' demonstrated propensity to rescue them turns taxpayers into
disadvantaged equity investors in such firms. The current system of shareholder
lawsuits compounds rather than limits taxpayer loss exposure. The simplest
approach would be to amend corporate law to assign taxpayers an actionable
equitable interest in all firms that accept protection from the safety net. Pushing
the idea one step further, Kane argues for establishing single-purpose
trusteeships at systemically important financial firms (SIFIs) and requiring each
trusteeship to make sure that each SIFI's managers do three things: measure
regularly, report honestly, and pay a fair return on the evolving value of
taxpayers' equity stake in their enterprise.43
Kane offers two justifications for taking this responsibility away from
unaccountable government regulators and supervisors and establishing an
41. Id.
42. FRANCIS BACON, Sir Francis Bacon to the Earl ofEssex Concerning the Earl ofTyrone, in
3 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON, LORD CHANCELLOR OF ENGLAND 6 (Basil Montagu ed., 1850).
43. Edward J. Kane, Research Prof. of Fin., Boston. Col., The Inevitability of Shadowy
Banking, Address at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta's 2012 Financial Markets Conference (April





enforceable system of fiduciary duties at the firm level instead. The first is a
legal argument: the idea that, because taxpayers are de facto equity investors,
corporate law should be broadened to accord taxpayers the same informational
and fiduciary rights to prudent stewardship that the law gives to a SIFI's
explicit shareholders. This would make explicit duties that conscientious
managers should have recognized at least implicitly all along. The second is a
moral argument based on Kant's Second Imperative. Kant's second imperative
maintains that exploitation of others is intrinsically wrong." Kant argues that
one may not rightfully use other parties-as financiers operating in and out of
the shadows have used federal taxpayers-only as means to benefit oneself.
In the US, each trusteeship might be governed by three trustees recruited
for character and financial expertise by the Office of Financial Research (OFR).
The OFR could use the same techniques for soliciting and screening candidates
that it employed in 2011-12 to staff its own advisory board. Terms of service
might be fixed for 3-to-5 years and permanently staggered to assure the
presence at all times of experienced hands on the teller.
A critical feature is that trustees could be sued personally if they fail to
enforce taxpayer interests. This would not make trustees capture-proof. But it
would make them less incentive-conflicted than government policymakers are
now and subject them to outside discipline from underwriters of director and
officer liability insurance. The trustees at different SIFIs could be expected to
organize a standard-setting association, consult with one another on emerging
problems, and to hire sufficient staff to double-check and be ready to challenge
publically bank and regulator estimates of the dividends taxpayers are due each
quarter.
Trustees would be independent of the boards of the firms they oversee.
Their primary responsibility would be to set a fair quarterly dividend and to see
that dividends are collected and transmitted to the Treasury in a timely manner.
To assure payment in difficult circumstances, they might be granted a limited
right to sell out-of-the-money puts on the firm's shares and to cover losses on
these puts from treasury stock (i.e., to dilute shareholder positions immediately)
if one of several specified adverse events were to occur. The essence of the
plan is not only to privatize, but also to extend the monitoring functions that in-
house government examiners have fulfilled at very large US banks for years.
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VII. How Incentive Conflict Expands Systemic Risk and the Financial Safety
Net45
Suppose the government allowed your banker to send you monthly
statements in a format that was so complicated that he could be sure that you
would not be able to figure out whether your account balanced or not. Then,
taking advantage of your ignorance, he goes on to transfer money out of your
account each month and dares incentive-conflicted bank examiners to uncover
and publicize his thefts.
While abusive financial engineering is subtler than this, the crime of
expropriating taxpayer resources through the safety net proceeds in more or
less the same way. To disincentivize this behavior, reformers must improve the
accounting framework to make the crooked funds transfers easier to see and
strengthen examiner incentives to publicize and punish expropriation when
they see it. That is what my proposal to re-engineer the supervision of
systematically important financial institutions (SIFIs) aims to do.
Financial engineering becomes abusive when-as the Regulatory
Dialectic predicts it will-managers use technological innovations to exploit a
country's taxpayers in hard-to-observe ways and personal culpability for
safety-net abuse is eliminated by regulatory lags and regulatory capture. The
resulting risk-taking destructively sows the seeds of future insolvencies and
financial crisis.
As noted earlier, taxpayers hold a disadvantaged compound option on
protected firms' profits and losses. The put assigns them without limitation the
deep downside of firm losses, while the call cuts off taxpayer claims on future
profits if and when the firm returns to robust health. Contingent-claims analysis
can estimate the value of a protected firm's side of the put and call. It also tell
us that this value increases both with the volatility of a firm's asset holdings
and with the fragility of its funding structure. Empirical research I have
conducted with various colleagueS46 shows that periodic dividends due on
taxpayers' equity stake in politically or administratively difficult-to-fail firms
can be defined and measured as the value of the warranted return on an
individual firm's contribution to the financial sector's aggregate portfolio of
taxpayer puts and calls. By reinforcing authorities' rescue propensity, a firm
can further disadvantage taxpayers by building up its political clout, size, and
complexity. Each of these attributes enhances management's ability to delay or
45. Edward J. Kane, Basel II: A Contracting Perspective, 32 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 39 (2007);
Edward J. Kane, supra note 43. This discussion draws explicitly on Kane (2007, 2012).
46. Santiago Carbo, Edward J. Kane, & Francisco Rodriguez, Evidence of Diferences in the
Effectiveness of Safety-Net Management in European Union Countries, 34 J. FIN. SERV. RESEARCH 151
(2008); Santiago Carbo, Edward J. Kane, and Francisco Rodriguez, Evidence ofRegulatory Arbitrage in
Cross-Border Mergers of Banks in the EU, 44 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 609 (2012); Santiago
Carbo, Edward J. Kane, and Francisco Rodriguez, Safety-Net Benefits Conferred on Difficult-to-Fail-





avoid regulatory punishments and to use the resulting period of grace to
neutralize regulatory restraints and to gamble for resurrection.
A. Operational Weaknesses of Capital Requirements
Before, after, and during the crisis, capital requirements have served as the
major instrument for containing shadowy banking practices. Capital
requirements seek to limit safety-net subsidies not by improving banking
ethics, but by setting boundaries on the extent to which regulated institutions
can leverage their accounting balance sheets. The plan is to keep losses from
spilling beyond a firm's internal capacity to bear losses by aligning its
ownership capital with its exposure to economic loss.
The linchpin of the Basel system of capital requirements is to measure
loss exposure by the sum of risk-weighted assets (RWA).47 The weights
employed in the first two accords were fixed at arbitrary levels and gave a bank
virtually no credit for the extent to which it might have diversified or hedged
the risks in its loan portfolio. Weighting formulas took inadequate account of
operational or interest-rate risks. Finally, although Basel II authorized tying
some weights to credit ratings, none of the accords has linked the system of risk
weights it applies to a benchmark set of assets or to movements in the average
or marginal risk premiums that one could observe in loan or swap markets.48
These disconnects artificially distort bank risk-transfer activity by creating
opportunities for clever banks to capture safety-net subsidies by arbitraging the
weighting system. The first principal loophole came from large institutions'
success in persuading Credit Rating Organizations (CROs) to help them to
game the Basel system by overrating shadowy packages of securitized loans.
A second avenue of avoidance was that, when regulatory demands for capital
first began to generate a compliance burden at a particular bank, its managers
found it temptingly easy to book counterfeit increments in regulatory capital by
manipulating its loan-loss reserves and by selling or securitizing a sufficient
amount of its least-risky assets.
Prior to the crisis, regulators did not seem very worried about the size and
perversity of various accounting, securitization, swap, and loan-sales loopholes.
Even after the crisis ensued, practical people more or less turned a blind eye
toward the accounting loopholes in the Basel system. The fact that during the
crisis even obviously distressed banks continued to post a capital position far in
excess of Basel standards suggests that Basel's minimum standards were easy
47. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is beginning to question the risk-
weighting methods. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REPORT TO G20 FINANCE
MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK GOVERNORS ON MONITORING IMPLEMENTATION OF BASEL III
REGULATORY REFORM 2 (2013).
48. Id.
49. This and ISDA's reluctance to keep credit default swaps on Greece from paying off as the
price of Greek debt declined exemplify how shadowy institutions tend to corrupt one another.
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to game. Despite efforts by U.S. and foreign regulators to increase the
granularity of the risk categories by which capital standards were set in
previous years, risk-weighted capital proved of no help in predicting what
banks would and would not need to be rescued.o
In the forum in which Basel III and its successors are being crafted today
(the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, BCBS), reform plans continue
to mischaracterize capital as an accounting-generated number and to misweight
risk in response to political concerns: Although one would hope they know
better, negotiators act as if it is acceptable to temper the fiduciary duties that
this paper associates with monitoring the size of, and collecting a fair return on,
taxpayer contributions to bank equity. They content themselves with aligning a
banking organization's accounting leverage with politically distorted
conceptions of its exposure to risk. In Basel III, regulators have decided to
downplay Basel II's emphasis on risk-weighting and to force protected
institutions to accept a marked increase in their equilibrium ratio of accounting
net worth to total assets. But leeway inherent in reporting loan-loss reserves
and other discretionary items makes accounting net worth a shadowy concept
whose value need not reliably reflect an institution's ability to absorb losses
generated by its appetite for risk. In practice, a firm whose books make a show
of high capital is often more risky than a firm whose books show less.5 1
Hence, the preventive leg of the Basel policy prognosis relies on overly
hopeful assumptions that are not supported by empirical research. Financial
crises are a fact of life. Where data exist, they show that every country's
financial sector passes through a succession of three-stage sequences: a pre-
crisis bubble in credit, an actual crisis, and a post-crisis period of creative
destruction and healthy recovery.5 2 Of course, the durations of the different
stages vary across countries and across time, and transitions from one stage to
another become clear only in retrospect.
But bubbles and crises can be amplified by weaknesses in insolvency
detection and by subsidies to risk that zombie firms generate as they battle for
bailouts. The Regulatory Dialectic portrays crises and subsidies as generated in
large part by path-dependent collisions between (1) efforts by regulators and
supervisors to control leverage and other forms of risk-taking and (2) disruptive
efforts by regulated and "shadowy" financial institutions to expand risks in
nontransparent ways and to shift responsibility for ruinous outcomes onto
creditors and national safety nets.
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from the Financial Crisis, 45 J. MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING 1147, 1155-60 (2013).
51. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, A Theory ofBank Capital, 55 J. FIN. 2431,
2454-55 (2000);.Michael Koehn & Anthony M. Santomero, Regulation of Bank Capital and Portfolio
Risk, 35 J. FIN. 1235, 1240-44 (1980).
52. CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL
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In the presence of a safety net, bank managers face a threefold avoidance
incentive: to lobby for lenient standards, to hide and understate risk exposures,
and to overstate accounting net worth. This set of incentives makes risk and
stockholder-contributed net worth hard to measure accurately and reliable
standards by which to judge improvements in incentive alignment difficult to
set and enforce.
B. Undone by the Regulatory Dialectic
Because regulators have relatively short terms in office, they are attracted
to temporary, rather than lasting fixes. The costs and benefits of capital
requirements extend far into the future and are by no means fixed or
exogenous. Regulatees search tirelessly for ways to reduce the burdens of
regulation. Value maximization leads bankers to devise progressively lower-
cost ways to exercise political clout, to adjust and misreport asset values and
funding structures, and to choose favorable jurisdictions in which to book
particular pieces of business.
This kind of financial engineering resembles what happens on a
"makeover" television show. Top managers deploy the equivalents of
fashionistas, cosmeticians, and hairdressers to revamp their firm's external
appearance without changing the underlying character of the risk exposures that
they expect taxpayers to support.
C. Can Basel Save Us?
The endogeneity of regulatory burdens should lead one to view: (1)
ongoing negotiations in the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision that seek
to establish global risk-based capital rules and (2) disruptive bank objections to
-and circumvention of-emerging rules as conflicting forces in a dialectical
53
evolutionary process that I model as a rigged game.
Weaknesses in the way U.S. and E.U. regulators chose to implement
Basel II standards created differences in the costs of loophole mining that help
to explain why the crisis hit their financial systems harder than those of
Canada, Asia, Latin America, and Oceania.54 Although Basel II tied risk
weights for sovereign debt to credit ratings, it permitted national authorities to
go below those weights for central-government debt (or debt guaranteed by a
central government) as long as it was issued and funded in the currency of the
country in question. For political reasons, U.S. regulators assigned
unrealistically low weights to mortgage-backed securities and E.U. officials set
zero risk weights for member-state debt. Until well into 2012, the European
Central Bank (ECB) contributed to the process by accepting the sovereign debt
53. Although this model can be formalized, only a narrative form is presented here.
54. See SHADOw FINANCIAL COMMrTTEE, 2011 REPORT (2011)..
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of all Eurozone countries at par value when posted as collateral for ECB loans.
The E.U. and ECB fueled speculators' demand for the debt of the "GIPSI"
nations of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy by not imposing "haircuts"
on these countries' increasingly risky securities as soon as the interest rates on
their debt began to soar above those paid by other Eurozone countries.
These delays were part of a larger strategy of cross-country denial and
concealment of financial-sector risk exposure. E.U. stress tests and Basel's
risk-weighted capital ratios failed demonstrably to distinguish between failing
and viable banks." The fundamental weakness in Basel I, II, and III is their
lack of enforcement procedures. Basel accords fail to make credit-rating
organizations and individual-country regulators accountable either to the Basel
Committee as a whole or to banking regulators in other member countries.
In the absence of an enforceable duty to disclose and service taxpayers'
equity stake, accounting loopholes make the idea of balance-sheet transparency
a sham. Politicians' and lobbyists' disinformational claim that tougher capital
requirements will make banks pass up profitable, but socially risky financial
opportunities seems distressingly dishonest. Accounting ratios are not difficult
to overstate and financial firms do not accept proposed regulatory burdens
passively. Other things equal, higher capital requirements lead difficult-to-fail
banks to choose riskier strategies and, both individually and collectively, to
conceal the resulting loss exposures from regulators and other outsiders so as to
minimize adverse effects on bank profits and stock prices. In the U.S., the
Occupy Wall Street movement very briefly energized a few ordinary citizens
into expressing rage about the game that regulators and regulatees were playing
on them. But these few rebellious sheep have had little lasting influence.
VIII. Policy Implications: The Need for Profound Changes in Both the Nature
of Information Flows and the Contractual Relationships Linking
Taxpayers to Protected Firms
It is factually and legally misleading to characterize credit support for
zombie institutions as a lending program, and financial safety nets as a source
of casualty insurance. Loans to zombie institutions and safety-net support are,
in fact, sources of loss-absorbing equity funding to protected firms. Neither
Basel nor the Dodd-Frank Act imposes the fiduciary duties of loyalty,
competence, and care on regulators and managers of difficult-to-fail institutions
that the taxpayer's equity position deserves.
Two related weaknesses continue to plague the U.S. and global regulatory
systems: (1) accounting ratios remain easy to manipulate, and even ruinous
risks are easy to hide and/or misrepresent legally and (2) authorities are willing




to exaggerate the "comfort" taxpayers should take from loan-loss reserves,
credit-rating firms, liquidity swaps, and sympathetically graded stress tests. The
root problem is that corporate law allows financial-institution managers to aim
at the mere appearance of regulatory compliance. Managers and regulators act
as if they are playing an amusing game of hide and seek. Managers feel legally
justified in hiding risks from regulators and repeatedly denying the existence
and extent of safety-net subsidies.
The root problem is an incentive conflict that is intensified by
disinformation, industry lobbying pressure, and post-government job
opportunities. Both in the U.S. and in Europe, ongoing negotiations between
different regulators show a willingness to paper over incentive distortions in the
web of safety-net supervision and to postpone the resolution of important issues
in ways that intensify rather than dispel the uncertainty and lack of trust that
have bedeviled wholesale financial markets since the crisis began. The Dodd-
Frank Act doled out the task of implementing its most controversial features as
a homework assignment for various regulatory agencies. Three years after the
passage of Dodd-Frank, many important issues remain unsettled, including:
risk retention in securitization; how to establish accountability for credit rating
organizations; variation in cross-country derivatives trading rules; limitations
on proprietary trading; and restrictions on compensation, dividends, and stock
buybacks. Delay in resolving these issues prolongs rulemakers' exposure to
further rounds of shadowy lobbying pressures and accommodates potentially
toxic safety-net abuse in the interim.
Governments develop regulatory institutions to compensate for
imperfections in counterparty transparency and in the enforceability of
contractual rights by private counterparties. To be efficient, the design and
operation of a country's safety net must not solely respond to country-specific
weaknesses in the transparency and disciplinary rights offered by financial
contracts between private parties. It must also, and more importantly, recognize
and repair longstanding weaknesses in the social contracts that taxpayers are
forced to write with managers of firms that the safety net protects. Regulators
and the financial sector have foisted defects in the transparency of-and lines
of responsibility for-safety net benefits and costs on the rest of society.
Whether and how proposed changes in rules improve a government's
contracting environment ought to be the benchmark by which we judge
financial reforms. The more shadowy the regulatory environment remains, the
more likely it is that governments' rescue propensities and the conjectural
governmental guarantees these propensities generate will undermine financial
stability and misdirect a portion of a country's scarce savings into wasteful
investments.
To reduce destructive incentive conflict, society must go beyond
tightening capital restraints. It must explore ways to make financiers help
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regulators to identify shadowy arrangements promptly and to narrow shadowy
bankers' access to the safety net more effectively.56 To my mind, this requires
society to find ways to impose and enforce fiduciary duties to taxpayers on
unwilling financiers, politicians, regulators, and credit-rating firms.57 The paper
stresses that safety-net subsidies generated by swap contracts have not been
adequately addressed. Swap transactions need to be monitored in a more timely
and effective fashion if only because failures to perform in swaps markets
could create great social unrest by globalizing the guarantees embodied in the
U.S. safety net and undermining promises made in the pension and insurance
industries.
To begin to reclaim an effective role in the politics of financial regulation,
taxpayers need a way to oversee and bypass the system of client-centered
regulation that has developed at the banking agencies, the SEC, and the CFTC.
As equity investors, taxpayers deserve to receive regular and unbiased
estimates of the value of their equity position in government-protected firms,
and to be assured that protected institutions will pay a fair dividend on the
equity that political forces make taxpayers take on. I believe societies around
the world would be better off if each country were to establish a well-funded
Office of Financial Research (OFR) and give the OFR the budgetary
independence that central banks have long enjoyed. To be free to measure and
report on systemic risk, an OFR desperately needs the freedom to resist short-
term budgetary interference.
Precisely because the benefits of shadowy arrangements are deliberately
overpraised by their proponents, taxpayers need to force individual SIFIs -
backed up by an OFR-to identify tail risk and safety-net consequences hidden
in instruments and structural arrangements that substitute for standard financial
contracts. One approach would be to require that trusteeships and individual-
country OFRs be notified by SIFIs and other major market participants to
undertake tail-risk analyses whenever the volume of trading being booked in a
particular derivative contract surpasses a specified size threshold. To enlist
alerts from trade associations for institutions losing business to new firms and
instruments, OFRs ought have the right to examine the business of unusually
fast-growing financial firms, especially firms that pioneer an unconventional
asset or funding structure.
To guard its political independence, I would recommend that the OFR
engage in informational and analytical activities, but be denied the authority to
sanction private firms directly. In the U.S., authority to disallow contracts or
institutions or to adjust deal-making parameters that the OFR finds to be
dangerous could be routed through the Systemic Risk Oversight Council or
56. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, 31 B.U. REV. OF BANKING & FIN. L.
619, 631-41 (2012).
57. Edward J. Kane, Importance of Monitoring and Mitigating the Safety-Net Consequences of




assigned directly to various federal agencies. But the OFR must have authority
-and even the duty-to demand information from and to criticize other
supervisory agencies. In particular, the OFR should be empowered to insist that
agencies responsible for monitoring and reserving for loss exposures that the
OFR determines to be worrisome have established reliable systems of oversight
and control.
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Appendix: Tables and Figures
TABLE 1
OPERATING PERFORMANCE BY UNIT, 2005 THROUGH SEPTEMBER
30, 2008





General Insurance $35,854 $51,708 $49,206 $45,174
Life Insurance & Retire- 14,271 53,570 50,878 48,020
ment
Financial Services (16,016) (1,309) 7,777 10,677
Asset Management 658 5,625 4,543 4,582
Other 531 457 483 344
Consolidation & Elimina- (436) 13 500 (16)
tions
Total $34,862 $110,064 $113,387 $108,781
Operating Income
(Loss)
General Insurance $(393) $10,562 $10,412 $2,315
Life Insurance & Retire- (19,561) 8,186 10,121 8,965
ment
Financial Services (22,880) (9,515) 383 4,424
Asset Management (2,709) 1,164 1,538 1,963
Other (2,899) (2,140) (1,435) (2,765)
Consolidation & Elimina- 237 722 668 311
tions
Total $(48,205 $8,943 $21,687 $15,213
Figures for 2005-2007 cover the full year.
Source: William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L.





NUMBER AND DISTRIBUTION OF SUBSIDIARIES: SELECTED TOP
FIFTY BANK HOLDING COMPANIES
Number Asset Value
Domestic %*
Name n O o _ Domestic Consolidated
0 Commercial Total
Bank Assets
1 JPMorgan Chase & Co. 4 2,936 451 3,391 86.1 2,265.8
2 Bank of America Co. 5 1,541 473 2,019 77.9 2,136.6
3 Citigroup Inc. 2 935 708 1,645 68.8 1,873.9
4 Wells Fargo & Co. 5 1,270 91 1,366 92.5 1,313.9
5 Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 1 1,444 1,670 3,115 11.2 923.7
6 MetLife, Inc. 1 39 123 163 3.2 799.6
7 Morgan Stanley 2 1,593 1,289 2,884 10.5 749.9
10 Bank of N.Y. Mellon Co. 3 211 146 360 83.2 325.8
20 Regions Financial Co. 1 35 4 40 97.1 127.0
30 Comerica Incorporated 2 72 2 76 99.8 61.1
40 First Horizon National Co. 1 35 1 37 99.1 24.8
50 Webster Financial Co. 1 21 0 22 99.8 18.7
86 13,670 5,847 19,603 70.4 14,359.1
*% of Y-9C Assets ** Y-9C Billions of USD
Source: Dafna Avraham, Patricia Salvaggi, and James Vickery, A
Structural View of U.S. Bank Holding Companies, 18 FRBNY ECON. POL'Y
REV. 65, 71 (2012).
Notes: Structure data are as of February 20, 2012. Financial data are as of
fourth-quarter 2011. The number of subsidiaries of each bank holding company
(BHC) is determined based on the Regulation Y definition of control. Asset
data include approximately 3,700 of the more than 19,000 subsidiaries
belonging to the top fifty BHCs that meet particular reporting threshold criteria.
Authors have an online appendix that provides more detail.
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TABLE 3
EVIDENCE ON THE EXTENT OF BANKS' NONCREDIT ACTIVITY
ALONG THE CHAIN OF STRUCTURED FINANCE
Top Fifty ABS Deals












Top Fifty ABCP Conduits









Source: Nicola, Cetorelli, Benjamin H. Mandel, and Lindsay Mollineaux,
The Evolution of Banks and Financial Intermediation: Framing the Analysis,
18 FRBNY EcoN. POL'Y REV. 1, 8 (2012). Constructed from data on fee
income published by Moody's covering securities services other than credit
enhancement (as issuers, underwriters, servicers, and trustees).
Note: ABS stands for asset-backed securities; ABCP represents asset-
backed commercial paper.
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NFIB Small Business Optimism Index
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Source: William C. Dunkelberg and Holly Wade, Small Business
Economic Trends November 2013, NFIB, http://www.nfib.com/research-
foundation/research-foundation-article?cmsid=64224.
805
Yale Journal on Regulation
FIGURE 3
Americans'Confidence in Federal Government's Handling of Domestic Problems
How much trust and confidence do you have in our federal government in Washington when it
comes to handling domestic problems -- a great deal. a fair amount, notvery much, or none at all?
I Agreat deal/A fairamount
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1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012
Source: Frank Newport and Joy Wilke, Fewer Americans Than Ever Trust
Gov't to Handle Problems, Gallup Politics, Sept. 13, 2013,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1 64393/fewer-americans-ever-trust-gov-handle-
problems.aspx. This chart comes from Gallup's annual Governance survey,
conducted Sept. 5-8, 2013, while Congress was debating the use of military
force in Syria, but prior to President Barack Obama's nationally televised
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Sources: Dafna Avraham, Patricia Salvaggi, and James Vickery, A
Structural View of U.S. Bank Holding Companies, 18 FRBNY ECON. POL'Y
REv. 65, 66 (2012). Constructed from two sources: National Information
Center; FR Y-10.
Note: Data are as of February 20, 2012, and December 31, 1990, and
include the top fifty bank holding companies (BHCs) at each of these dates.
Authors have an online appendix that provides more detail.
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